Why Does Texas Have a Constitutional Mechanic's Lien (and Why Doesn't California)?

California and Texas both recognize a right to a mechanic's lien in their constitutions. Apparently, this is unusual; most states do not have a constitutional right to a mechanic's lien. In fact, I'm not sure if any other states do (though they all provide for such liens by statute).

Texas's and California's mechanic's liens provisions are almost identical, but only Texas has what can be called a "constitutional mechanic's lien." Why is that?

What do the Constitutions say?

"Mechanics, persons furnishing materials, artisans, and laborers of every class, shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material for the value of such labor done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide, by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens." (Cal. Constitution, Art. XIV, section 3) (this version was adopted in 1976, but it reflects nearly identical language dating back to 1879).

"Mechanics, artisans and material men, of every class, shall have a lien upon the buildings and articles made or repaired by them for the value of their labor done thereon, or material furnished therefor; and the Legislature shall provide by law for the speedy and efficient enforcement of said liens." (Tex. Constitution, Art. XVI, section 37) (adopted 1876).

Notice how similar the language is:

1. The liens are available to "mechanics," "material men" or "persons furnishing materials," and "artisans" of every class. California adds "laborers";

2. Those classes of persons "shall have a lien upon" "the buildings and articles made or repaired" (Texas) or "the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material" (California);

3. The amount shall be "the value of their labor" or material furnished; and

4. "[T]he Legislature" "shall provide" "by law" "for the speedy and efficient enforcement of [said/such] liens."

The language is almost identical between the two constitutions.

Did California just adopt the Texas provision?

Perhaps, but I have not been able to find confirmation.

Do courts treat them differently?

Yes. As mentioned above, Texas recognizes a constitutional mechanic's lien. That is, even if the statutory requirements are not strictly followed, direct contractors might still have a right to a constitutional lien.

The same is not true in California. A California mechanic's lien will not be enforceable if the claimant does not adhere to the statutory requirements.

Why are they treated differently?

This boils down to state constitutional law. The issue is when constitutional provisions operate on their own (i.e., without the necessity of clarifying or supplementing legislation). In both Texas and California, courts distinguish between those constitutional provisions that are self-executing and those that are not.

California

California courts have a couple of tests to determine if a provision is self-executing. One court held that a constitutional provision "is self-executing if no legislation is necessary to give effect to it, and if there is nothing to be done by the Legislature to put it into operation." (Leger v. Stockton Unified School District (1988) 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 1454). And the inverse is also true: "[a] constitutional provision contemplating and requiring legislation is not self-executing." (Taylor v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 951).

What does this mean for mechanic's liens? The language "...the Legislature shall provide..." makes the provision not self-executing. The predecessor to the current mechanic's lien provision was held to be "not self-executing, and is inoperative except as supplemented by the Legislature through its power reasonably to regulate and to provide for the exercise of the right, the manner of its exercise, the time when it attached, and the time within which and the persons against whom it could be enforced." (Frank Curran Lumber Co. v. Eleven Co. (1969) 271 Cal. App. 2d 175, 183).

Texas

Texas, by contrast, considers its provision (and recall that it's nearly the exact same provision) self-executing. The Texas test as to whether a provision is self-executing is "if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected [...] and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which these principles may be given force of law." (Hendee v. Dewhurst (2007) 228 S.W. 3d 354, 369).

As applied to mechanic's liens, "[i]t is well settled that the above provision grants a lien which is self-executing and exists independently and apart from any legislative act." (First National Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp. (1974) 517 S.W.2d 262, 267) (see also Strang v. Pray (1896) 89 Tex. 525, 528. "This constitutional provision is self-executing as between the owner and the laborers and materialmen who contract directly with the owner, without reliance on any statutory provisions." (Hayek v. Western Steel Co. (1972) 478 S.W. 2d 786, 790).

Summary

In short, Texas and California have nearly the same provision, and they make the same constitutional distinction (self-executing or not). But Texas courts ask if the provision supplies a sufficient rule, while California courts ask if there is "no legislation necessary" to give it effect.

Conclusion

Texas and California are unique in providing a right to a mechanic's lien in their constitutions. But their respective courts treat their nearly-identical constitutional provisions differently. California seems to look to whether the procedures are clear, where Texas looks simply to whether or not there is such a right. The result is that the provision is not self-executing in California, but is self-executing in Texas!